ABSTRACT Most existing trust-based security schemes for mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) consider packet loss an indicator of possible attacks by malicious nodes. There may be several reasons for packet losses, such as interference, queue overflow, and node mobility. Identifying the real underlying cause of a packet loss event is important for any security solution. To detect truly malicious nodes, it is necessary to carry out a fine-grained analysis (FGA) to determine the underlying cause of such loss. Without such analysis, the performance of any security solution may degrade, due to the punishment of innocent nodes while actual malicious nodes may remain undetected. Therefore, approaches are required that can correctly identify the reason for packet losses and can react accordingly. In this paper, we present a scheme that is able to correctly identify malicious nodes, using network parameters to determine whether packet losses are due to queue overflows or node mobility in MANETs. The contributions of this paper include the FGA scheme for packet loss and the development of a comprehensive trust model for malicious node identification and isolation. Our proposed FGA scheme is evaluated in terms of effectiveness and performance metrics under different network parameters and configurations. The experimental results show that our proposed trust model achieves a significant reduction in false positives rate and an increase in the rate of detection of truly malicious nodes compared with traditional non-FGA schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), a set of mobile nodes are connected via wireless links in an infrastructure-less network. While cooperation is expected by all nodes in order to ensure a proper functionality of the MANET, many inherent constraints, such as constantly changing topology and fullydistributed architecture, make these networks vulnerable to various attacks by misbehaving nodes. Examples of such attacks are: (a) a node drops data packets due to malicious behavior; (b) a node provides falsified routing information to other nodes in order to disrupt the network, and (c) a node does not participate in routing operations in order to save its own energy [1] . To identify and isolate non-cooperative nodes in MANETs, a range of trust-based security schemes [2] - [6] have been proposed. In MANETs, trust can be defined as to what extent a node can fulfill the expectations of another node [7] . In trust-based schemes, each node within the network manages an independent trust table to compute and store the trust values of other nodes. Routing decisions are then based on such computed trust values.
There are scenarios, however, in which current trust-based schemes fail to capture the real underlying causes of an adverse event. This leads to many false positives by which legitimate nodes are declared malicious and to low detection rates for malicious nodes. The reason for such shortcomings is that those trust-based security schemes assume that packet losses only arise because of malicious activities by misbehaving nodes. However, packet losses in MANETs may arise due to other adverse events, such as wireless link transmission errors, mobility, and congestion [8] . Without a fine-grained analysis of packet losses in the trust building process, traditional schemes may result in erroneous trust estimations, especially under high data rate and high node mobility [1] , [2] , [9] - [12] .
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Detecting and reacting to packet losses is an important component of any comprehensive security solution. To avoid false positives, before isolating malicious nodes from the path in trust-based security schemes, a thorough investigation and analysis are required to find the actual cause of the packet loss. Without such analysis, the performance of any underlying security solution may degrade, resulting in the punishment of innocent nodes and disconnection of portions of the network, while actual malicious nodes remain undetected. Therefore, current MANET trust-based schemes need to be extended with approaches able to perform a correct diagnosis of packet losses, considering run-time network conditions to detect truly misbehaving nodes.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we propose a fine-grained analysis (FGA) scheme that investigates the causes of data packet losses and reports the most likely cause of these losses. We first identify the key parameters for analyzing the cause of packet losses under different aspects. Our FGA scheme uses several different parameters such as MAC layer information, queue information, and rate of link changes to profile the links between nodes as well as the nodes' neighborhoods. The reason for using local information at each node is to achieve more accurate information and view of network. Although global information may in some cases provide sufficient information, it is possible that false information provided by the misbehaving node can circumvent the security mechanisms. Moreover, as the FGA scheme requires information about the node neighborhood, each node uses its own local information to take a more informed decision. Then, based on the identified parameters, we develop a mathematical model for the FGA scheme. Each node locally analyzes the neighbors' trustworthiness with respect to packet forwarding using our FGA parameters. The proposed FGA scheme can be implemented on top of any baseline trust-based scheme that allows nodes to individually assess the trustworthiness of other nodes. Moreover, we provide an implementation of our model in a real routing protocol, the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol [13] , and evaluate it through extensive simulations with NS-2 under varying network conditions. Furthermore, we compare our proposed FGA scheme with one of the most recent schemes, hereafter referred to as ''Non-FGA scheme'' [14] , which does not employ a finegrained analysis of packet losses, and show that our approach achieves better results (for details about the scheme, refer to Section II.)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related work. Section III presents the analysis of possible packet loss reasons in MANETs. A discussion on our FGA parameters and the formulation of our model for MANETs is given in Section IV. Section V presents the simulation results and summarizes the performance evaluation. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss existing trust-based security schemes for MANETs. Marti et al. [2] proposed one of the first key approaches. They proposed a watchdog and path-rater mechanism implemented on the DSR protocol to minimize the impact of malicious nodes on the throughput of the network. Such mechanism has the major shortcoming that each packet drop is considered as misbehavior by a node regardless of the reason for the packet drop. Moreover, such scheme cannot detect the misbehaving nodes in the case of ambiguous packet collision, receiver packet collision, limited transmission power, partial dropping, and collaborative attacks. To address such shortcomings, various approaches were proposed, such as acknowledgment-based detection schemes including TWOACK [11] , AACK [15] , and EEACK [6] . The TWOACK scheme was proposed to solve the shortcomings of the watchdog and path-rater scheme, such as receiver packet collision and limited transmission power problem. In the TWOACK scheme, every three consecutive nodes in the path from sender to the destination are required to acknowledge every transmitted packet. An improved version of the TWOACK scheme, called AACK, was proposed by Sheltami et al. [15] . Basically, the AACK scheme is a combination of the TWOACK scheme and an end-to-end acknowledgement scheme. Although some of the overhead is reduced in the AACK scheme in comparison to the TWOACK scheme, the AACK scheme till suffers from the problem of detecting malicious nodes in the presence of false misbehavior reports and forged acknowledgment packets. To address the shortcomings of such acknowledgementbased schemes, Shakshuki et al. [6] proposed the Enhanced Adaptive ACKnowledgement (EAACK) protocol to detect misbehavior nodes in MANETs environment using DSA and RSA digital signatures. Their technique can validate and authenticate the acknowledgement packets, but at the expense of extra resources; it also requires pre-distributed keys for digital signatures.
To estimate the packet loss rate over link, De Couto et al. [16] proposed a scheme which uses expected transmission count metrics, similar to the ETT metric [17] . Such scheme successfully computes the packet loss rate, but it is unable to identify the actual cause of packet loss. Shebaro et al. [18] proposed a fine-grained analysis scheme to analyze the packet loss reasons in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In such an approach, the parameters used for link profiling are the received signal strength indicator (RSSI), the link quality indicator (LQI), and the packet reception rate (PRR). This approach is very effective for WSNs which have a relatively static topology but the profiling parameters used by this approach cannot be easily applied to MANETs which are highly dynamic environments.
Buchegger and Boudec [3] proposed the CONFIDANT (Cooperation of nodes fairness in dynamic ad hoc networks) protocol to detect and respond to misbehaving nodes. Their trust architecture [3] consists of four components: monitor, reputation system, path manager, and trust manager. One of the shortcomings of the CONFIDANT protocol is that it suffers from the problem of conflicting update reports. In case of conflicting update reports, the source node is unable to make correct decisions about node trustworthiness. Moreover, to avoid false praise attack [7] , only negative VOLUME 5, 2017 experiences as second-hand information are shared amongst nodes but that may also cause bad-mouthing attacks [7] . To avoid such attacks, Shabut et al. [14] proposed a defense trust scheme which filters the second-hand information based on three parameters: confidence (how many interactions the recommender node had with the evaluated node), deviation between the evaluating and recommender node views about the evaluated node, and distance.
Parker et al. [19] suggested an intrusion detection scheme that requires the monitoring nodes to overhear traffic in their transmission ranges. They argued that such traffic overhearing can lead to successful detection of message dropping and modification attacks. However, attacks such as misrouting attacks (i.e. the attacker forwards packets to the wrong next hop) cannot be detected. A collaborative reputationbased solution, called CORE, was proposed by Michiardi and Molva [20] to evaluate the reputation of a node. They suggested that collaborative reputation is the combination of subjective, indirect, and functional reputations. A reputation table is maintained at each node to record the reputation of other nodes and to determine whether a node is malicious or not. Inspired from the court procedure in a judiciary system, a secure solution for MANETs, called distributed court system (DCS), has been proposed by Zhang and Yeo [21] . DCS executes the following steps for misbehaving node detection: (a) accusation, (b) investigation, (c) defense, and (d) action. Anjum and Talpade [22] proposed a lightweight packet drop detection for ad-hoc networks (LiPaD). They suggested that every node must keep a count of received/forwarded packets and periodically report to a coordinator node for analysis and malicious node detection. Such technique requires a computationally powerful, central coordinator node that is practically not feasible in MANETs. Sun et al. [23] proposed a trust evaluation mechanism for distributed networks, such as MANET and sensor networks, with focus on protecting the systems against different attacks.
All the approaches discussed in this section consider each packet loss as misbehavior by malicious nodes, without analyzing the other possible causes of packet losses. This can result in erroneous trust estimation, especially under high node's mobility. In contrast, our proposed scheme is based on a FGA technique and thus results in better trust estimation.
III. ANALYZING THE CAUSES OF PACKET LOSSES
In this section, we analyze the possible causes of packet losses in MANETs. In MANETs, packet losses can be mainly categorized in three categories: node-related, congestion-related, and mobility-related [8] . In the following, we discuss these categories in details.
• Node-related losses Selfish or Malicious node: A node in a forwarding path may intentionally refuse to forward routing or data traffic either to save its limited resources (selfish behavior), or to disrupt the network functionality and performance (malicious behavior).
• Mobility-related losses Packet losses in this category may occur at the MAC layer and the routing layer. MAC layer: If the next hop of a packet is out of range, a packet loss occurs. This phenomenon is more common in highly mobile networks as compared to low mobility networks, as the routing information becomes obsolete faster with increasing node mobility.
Routing layer: When a packet arrives at the network layer, the routing protocol checks for a valid route and, if such a route exists, the packet is forwarded. In case a route to the destination is not available, the packet is buffered. A packet is dropped in two cases: when the packet stays in the buffer over the timeout limit; when the packet cannot be buffered because of buffer overflow.
• Congestion-related losses Packet losses in this category occur at the MAC layer because of the following reasons.
Queuing problem: Due to high data rate and limited link bandwidth which leads to congestion and queue overflow, an incoming packet may be dropped by a forwarding node. Busy channel: Data channel at the forwarding node may be so busy that the number of backoffs exceeds the limit; hence the packet is dropped. Link interference: Due to some link-related phenomena, such as high bit error rate, hidden nodes, and interference, a data packet may be dropped or discarded because of transmission errors. To analyze which parameters are related to the various reasons for packet losses, we simulate the OLSR protocol with varying network parameters. It is important to mention that even though OLSR has been used for a long time, we chose it as it is one of the standard routing protocols in MANETs, whose status is denoted as experimental RFC by the IETF [24] . OLSR is well studied in the research community, and many schemes use OLSR as underlying protocol [25] - [29] . However, our proposed scheme can be used with any underlying MANET routing protocol. The basic purpose of the simulation experiments is to show that packet drops are not only caused by malicious node behavior, as assumed by most trust-based security schemes for MANETs, but may be caused by several other reasons. For our simulation, we use a total number of 60 nodes, with 10% malicious nodes. In order to simulate more realistic data traffic scenarios, randomly spread source-destination pairs are selected. The total number of count of such pairs is 30% of the total deployed nodes in the network. The data packet size used in this set of simulation experiments is 512 bytes. For random mobility simulation, a random way point mobility model [30] is used. In such a mobility model, when a node reaches its target destination, after a given pause time, the node starts targeting another random destination. We manage this mobility model by varying the maximum speed of the nodes. The simulation time for each run is 1000 seconds. Each data point represents an average of 10-15 runs with identical traffic models, but different randomly generated mobility scenarios. We consider the total packet loss as the total number of packets dropped out of the total number of transmitted packets as shown Figure 1 (a) and 1(c). We then break down the total number of packet drops, in the same plots, into three elements, depending on the specific cause of the drop: the packet drops caused by malicious nodes (''MAL-drop'' in the graphs), the packet drops due to route unavailability (''NRTE-drop''), and the packet drops due to full interface queue (''IFQ-drop'').
A. EFFECT OF DATA RATE
Figure 1(a) shows the total packet losses for increasing data rate. As shown in the figure, the packet loss increases for increasing data rates. Figure 1(b) explains the different reasons of such packet losses. Figure 1(b) shows the effect of the data rate on each packet loss rate. With increasing data rate, the packet drop rate due to interface queue is higher as compared to other packet loss reasons. The reason is that with increasing data rate, the queues of the forwarding nodes overflow, resulting in packet drops at the interface queue.
B. EFFECT OF MOBILITY
Figure 1(c) shows the total packet loss for increasing data rate. As shown in the figure, the packet loss increases for increasing node mobility. Figure 1(d) shows the packet loss rate due to each reason with increasing node speed. It is obvious from the figure that the packet loss rate due to the overflow of the interface queue is higher compared to packet losses due to other causes, but it decreases for increasing node speed. The reason is that packets are now being dropped due to the impossibility to find a route at the forwarding nodes. With increasing node speed, the topology changes more frequently, causing more routing path changes, hence a higher packet loss rate due to route unavailability at the forwarding nodes.
IV. FINE-GRAINED ANALYSIS (FGA) SCHEME
In this section, we identify the parameters for profiling the link between two nodes to analyze the packet loss.
A. FGA PARAMETERS FOR PACKET LOSS
In this section, we introduce the basic parameters used in profiling the links among nodes based on the analysis and simulations of packet losses discussed in Section III. To differentiate between a packet drop due to network conditions from one due to attacks by malicious node/s, we identify the following parameters for analyzing the possible cause of packet drop. The range of values taken by each parameter is a decimal value ranging in [0, 1]. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that, in our model, the FGA scheme is deployed at each individual node. VOLUME 5, 2017 As mentioned in Section III, a packet may be dropped at the MAC layer of a forwarding node for various reasons, such as out-of-range next hop or obsolete routing entries. So, the MAC layer information is one of the most important parameters in order to analyze the possible causes for packet loss between two nodes. As mentioned in the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer specifications, a sender node sends a data packet and receives a link-layer acknowledgment from the receiver [16] . In order to test a link for possible transmission of data packet, De Couto et al. [16] proposed sending a probe packet before sending the actual data packet. For example, each node broadcasts a probe packet every second for 10 seconds. Suppose that node A has received 7 packets from node B. At the same time B found out that it had received 9 probe packets from A. Thus, the loss rate of packets from A to B is 0.3, the packet forwarding probability is 1 − 0.3 = 0.7, while the loss rate of packets from B to A is 0.1. Thus, the probability that the data packet will be successfully transmitted from A to B in a single attempt is 1 − 0.3 = 0.7.
We employ a link profiling mechanism that takes into account the activities and characteristics of a particular link between two nodes. In our approach, in order to avoid extra overhead in link profiling, we leverage the HELLO messages already exchanged in the routing protocol. Each node periodically exchanges with its neighbors the list of one-hop neighbor nodes through a preset number of HELLO messages. Each node then keeps the received HELLO records about its neighbor nodes. If a node is receiving the expected number of HELLO messages from neighbor nodes, then it means that there is no link interference over the link. So, if a node drops a data packet, it can be identified as a misbehaving node, discarding the possibility of a link problem. However, if a node does not receive the expected number of HELLO messages from some neighbor nodes, this is an indicator that some link interference problem exists between these two nodes. In our scheme, in addition to the neighbor list, a forwarding node will also exchange information about the link status of each of its neighbor nodes. A node A can compute the probability that the data packet will be successfully transmitted to a node B by observing the quality of the link layer between the two nodes using HELLO messages. We use the following formula for computing the packet forwarding probability at the MAC layer between two nodes:
where ξ recv is the total number of HELLO packets received and ξ exp is the expected number of HELLO packets during a particular interval (t i−1 , t i ).
2) QUEUE OVERFLOW
In MANETs, queues may overflow due to the multiple simultaneous roles that nodes have, such as being both routers and terminals as well as multi-hop forwarding nodes, and to the frequent transmission of topology messages. When the amount of routing traffic is exceptionally high, data traffic might not be transmitted at all or be transmitted at a very low rate, which might result in its stagnation [31] , [32] . Due to node queue overflow, a packet can be dropped by a forwarding node, and this node may be marked as misbehaving by the source node even though it is not. Moreover, congestion resulting from an amount of data packets that exceeds the queue length may also lead to packet losses by overflowing the queue. Traffic load intensity (TLI) [33] is a metric used to determine the queue status at the neighboring nodes. In our scheme, a source node keeps track of the latest traffic load statistics at each forwarding node in a table. Each forwarding node periodically samples its interface queue length at the MAC layer, and communicates it to the source node as a part of its HELLO messages. Let B be a forwarding node, let q j be the j th sample value indicating the queue length at the current instant, and Q be the total number of queue length samples collected over the time period of interest, then the average traffic load at node B can be formulated as following:
Let q max be maximum length of the interface queue of node B at the MAC layer, then the traffic load intensity function at node B is defined as follows:
Then, the packet forwarding success probability with respect to possible queue overflows (denoted by P Q ) at node B can be modeled using the following expression:
The packet forwarding probability is related to the TLI , which means that a smaller value of the TLI results in a higher packet forwarding probability and vice versa. It is interesting to point out that a higher node density (meaning a large number of neighbor nodes) normally leads to more traffic and therefore higher TLI for the forwarding nodes, hence lowering the overall packet forwarding probability.
It is important to consider the security implications when a malicious node does not truthfully follow the protocol and lies about its queue status. For example, a malicious node may say that its queue is constantly full. Such a node would be removed from the routing path, an undesirable outcome for attackers. Therefore, malicious nodes have little reason to share wrong status information about the queue, as nodes with potential queue overflows will not be selected as forwarding nodes.
3) MOBILITY/RATE OF LINK CHANGES
Most of the trust-based schemes leverage overhearing techniques to assess the trustworthiness of a node. In such techniques, a node that forwards a packet to its next hop also makes sure to overhear the re-transmission of that packet to the following hop in the promiscuous mode. This is vital in ensuring, eventually, a correct delivery of the packet to its final destination. If a source node overhears the packet forwarding from the forwarding node, it is considered as a successful interaction; otherwise, it is considered as a misbehavior. In cases in which a source node cannot properly overhear the re-transmission of its packet even though it occurred, or a destination node is unreachable due to stale routing information, a benign forwarding node may be marked as misbehaving. For this reason, node mobility has an important role in understanding the trustworthiness of a forwarding node. A node can determine the mobility of the nodes in its neighborhood by computing the neighborhood rate of link changes [34] . Such rate can then be leveraged to analyze the possible causes of packet loss events. We can determine the rate of link changes at node u using the following equation:
where λ u is the link arrival rate and µ u is the link breakage rate experienced by the node u [35] . Based on the results by Samar and Wicker [35] that show how the maximum link arrival rate λ u max is equal to the breakage rate, the maximum link change rate (η u max) is formulated as λ u max +µ u max = 2 · σ u . The rate of link changes can be formulated as follows:
Using the above equation, the probability of successful packet forwarding with respect to the rate of link changes can be formulated as:
It is obvious from the above equation that higher rates of link changes indicating more dynamic neighborhoods will result in a lower probability of successful packet forwarding.
B. ALGORITHM AND MATHEMATICAL MODEL
In this section, we leverage the FGA parameters identified and discussed in the previous subsection in order to provide a formal mathematical model of our proposed FGA scheme. By combining the packet drop probabilities discussed in Section IV .A, we can obtain the final packet forwarding probability index (FPI), which is the probability that a packet would be correctly forwarded, using the following equation:
where α, β, and γ are the weights assigned to each one of the parameters. Such weights are application-and networkdependent, since the network administrator might choose to privilege some parameters over others while doing a FGA of packet losses. The value of the FPI will be calculated by a source node and compared to the current behavior of each node, in order to rate the correctness of the computed trustworthiness level by the underlying trust-based scheme. Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo code for our FGA scheme. for all neighbor nodes u do 3: FPI u ← computeFPI (u); 4: recomputeTrust(u); 5: end for 6: end procedure 7: procedure recomputeTrust(nodeId, FPI) 8: if (ρ > 0) then ρ is the packet loss rate 9: if FPI > th FPI then 10: τ --; τ is the trust computed by the underlying scheme 11: end if 12: end if 13: if (τ < th ρ ) then th ρ is the minimum trust threshold 14: nodeId is malicious 15: isolateAttacker(nodeId) 16: end if 17: end procedure 18: procedure computeFPI(nodeId) 19 :
23: end procedure 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our FGA scheme. Network Simulator 2 (NS-2) [36] version 2.34 is used to implement and analyze the performance of the scheme. We have modified the source code of UM-OLSR version 0.8.8 that is available as a patch in NS-2 [37] . The number of simulation experiments has been chosen sufficiently large in order to get 95% confidence interval for the results.
For the simulation experiments, we vary the mobility speed of the nodes between 1 and 10 m/s. Also, for a more realistic scenario, source/destination nodes are selected randomly in our simulation. Most of the simulation parameters are set according to the settings already presented in Section III. Table 1 lists the commonly used simulation parameters. In NS-2, every dropped packet is logged in a trace file alongside its dropping cause; therefore, we analyze the results of our evaluation experiments by parsing the trace files through an awk script. Following are the performance metrics considered in the analysis of our scheme:
• False Positives Rate: the ratio of the legitimate nodes declared as malicious to the total number of legitimate nodes.
• Detection Rate: the percentage of malicious nodes detected among the total number of malicious nodes within the network.
• Packet Loss Rate: the percentage of data packets dropped by misbehaving nodes out of the total number of transmitted data packets.
• Energy Consumption: the ratio of the average consumed energy at all the nodes to the initial energy at nodes.
A. ADVERSARIAL AND ENERGY MODEL
A packet drop attack model has been implemented in this work to validate the effectiveness of the proposed FGA scheme. In this type of attack model, a malicious node drops data packets randomly with 25% probability. The number of malicious nodes ranges between 5% and 20% of the total number of deployed nodes.
B. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF FGA PARAMETERS
To analyze the impact of each FGA parameter on the overall FGA analysis, we performed a set of simulation experiments. Our proposed scheme is compared with the Non-FGA scheme. This specific set of simulations is carried out with no malicious nodes in the network in order to better analyze the other causes of packet drops in both the schemes. Figure 2 (a) shows the false positives rate with increasing data rate under both schemes. With increasing data rate, queues overflow more often, causing data packet drops at the forwarding nodes. With our FGA scheme, the rate of false positives is smaller compared to the one of the Non-FGA scheme. In fact, each packet drop event is better analyzed before declaring the node as malicious. On the other hand, the traditional Non-FGA scheme simply considers each adverse event as an indicator of compromised forwarding nodes, resulting in a high false positive rate.
Figure 2(b) shows the false positives rate with increasing node moving speed, to evaluate the usefulness of our rate of link changes parameter. With increasing node speed, the rate of link changes increases, causing a higher packet drop rate at the forwarding nodes. In our FGA scheme, as shown in the figure, packet drops due to node mobility are not considered as malicious behavior, leading to a lower false positives rate as compared to the rate of the Non-FGA scheme.
C. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF FGA
In this set of simulation experiments, we evaluate our proposed FGA scheme in terms of several performance metrics, discussed in this section.
1) FALSE POSITIVES
We compared our proposed scheme with the Non-FGA scheme in terms of false positives, this time leveraging all the parameters together in our combined model, and introducing malicious nodes in the network. Figure 3(a) shows the false positives rate with increasing node moving speed. It is obvious from the figure that the false positive rate decreases to much greater extent in our FGA scheme than in the non-FGA scheme. In fact, the FGA scheme better evaluates the overall possible reason for a packet drop event and then takes a decision regarding the node's trustworthiness. Overall, the figure shows that the false positives rate increases with increasing node speed. The reason for this trend is that when nodes are moving with higher speeds, the chance of mis-overhearing at source node or stale routing information significantly increases, hence legitimate nodes are declared as malicious.
Similarly, Figure 3(b) shows the false positives rate with increasing node density in the network, keeping the node moving speed fixed at 4 m/sec. With increasing node count in the network, the number of source/destination pairs is also increasing, so more packets are dropped in the network due to collisions. In the FGA scheme, as each packet drop event is analyzed before taking any decision about the behavior of nodes, the number of false positives is smaller as compared to number in the Non-FGA scheme, that considers each packet drop as a malicious activity.
2) DETECTION RATE
Figure 4(a) shows the detection rate with increasing node moving speed under the FGA scheme and the Non-FGA scheme. The detection rate is higher in our FGA scheme, as each decision is more informed. We refer to the detection rate as the number of true malicious nodes that are detected by the scheme over the total number of malicious nodes. In the Non-FGA scheme, as every packet drop is considered malicious and the related node declared malicious, more legitimate nodes are mis-detected as malicious nodes. As shown in the figures, our FGA scheme has a higher detection rate compared to the rate of the Non-FGA scheme. Similarly, Figure 4 (b) shows the detection rate with increasing node density. With increasing node density, the number of data connections in the network also increases, hence more packets are dropped in the network due to collisions. The Non-FGA scheme considers such packet drops as misbehaving activity from legitimate nodes. Therefore, as shown in the figure, the detection rate is again higher in our FGA scheme than the rate in the Non-FGA scheme.
3) ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Figure 5(a) shows the energy consumed with increasing node speed under the FGA scheme and the Non-FGA scheme. The purpose of this experiment is to show the overhead incurred due to processing and communication cost in the FGA scheme with comparison to the Non-FGA scheme, that ultimately incurs a higher energy consumption. In MANETs, most of the node energy is consumed by packet sending and receiving. Our FGA scheme does not increase the number of exchanged messages, but instead leverages existing routing packets (already required by routing protocol standards) to exchange information such as queue status and link status. The only extra energy required by our FGA scheme is for processing different information, such as MAC layer information, rate of link changes, and queue information, which is negligible. Therefore, as shown in the figure, the energy consumed is almost the same in both the FGA and Non-FGA schemes, showing that our scheme greatly improves the security of the network without increasing energy consumption. 
4) PACKET LOSS RATE
Figure 5(b) shows the packet loss rate with increasing node speed under the FGA scheme and Non-FGA scheme. As shown in the figure, the packet loss rate is smaller in our FGA scheme than in the Non-FGA scheme. In fact, more trustworthy nodes are selected in the FGA scheme for the routing path, resulting in less packet losses and higher packet delivery ratio. In the case of the Non-FGA scheme, legitimate nodes are isolated from the path, resulting in a higher packet drop due to the non-availability of forwarding nodes to the destination. Moreover, true malicious nodes remain in the data path, leading to more chances for them to drop valuable data packets.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In MANETs, packet loss may occur due to several different reasons, such as link interference, congestion at forwarding nodes, queue overflow, and node mobility. In this paper, we presented a fine-grained analysis technique for packet losses in MANETs leveraging network parameters such as MAC layer information, forwarding node queue status, and node mobility. Then, we proposed a trust-based security scheme for malicious node isolation based on the fine-grained analysis of packet losses. Simulations were performed using NS-2 to analyze the functionality and performance of the proposed FGA scheme in terms of false positives, detection rate, and packet loss rate with increasing data rate, node speed, and node degree. Results show that our FGA scheme outperforms the traditional scheme with no fine-grained analysis on all metrics.
In our future work, we plan to further enhance the proposed scheme by considering more parameters that could be useful for our investigation, and evaluating the implications of deploying the FGA scheme only on a subset of the nodes while still preserving the good results achieved. Also, we intend to implement our FGA scheme on top of other routing protocols, such as AODV and DSR and several of the existing trust-based security mechanisms for MANETs to further evaluate its effectiveness. Her main research interests include security, privacy, digital identity management systems, database systems, distributed systems, and multimedia systems. Prof. Bertino is a fellow of the ACM. She served as the Editor-in-Chief of the VLDB Journal and the Editorial Board Member of the ACM TISSEC and the IEEE TDSC, and is currently serving as the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE TDSC. VOLUME 5, 2017 
